Section 12 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1966

Table of Contents

 

12. Grounds for challenge – (1) When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances –

(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or present relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subject-matter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other kind, which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and

(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire arbitration within a period of twelve months.

Explanation 1 – The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.

Explanation 2 – The disclosure shall be made by such person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule.

(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay, disclose to the parties in writing any circumstances referred to in sub- section (1) unless they have already been informed of them by him.

(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if –

(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality, or

(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.

(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.

(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute, falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:

Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an express agreement in writing.

Introduction 

Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) discusses the basis on which the appointment of an arbitrator may be challenged.1 These grounds find their roots in the elementary principles of natural justice, such is nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause, which was also referenced in the Voestalpine case discussed below), which, if not followed, may lead to unjust outcomes. Section 12 outlines the requirements and procedures for the disclosure of potential biases and conflicts of interest by arbitrators, both with respect to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the dispute (Section 12(1)(a)). It mandates that an individual considered for appointment as an arbitrator must disclose any relationships or interests that could compromise their independence and impartiality, as mentioned under Section 12(3)(a), or their ability to devote adequate time, or complete the arbitration on time (maximum twelve months as specified under Section 12(1)(b)). During the arbitration proceedings, arbitrators must continuously disclose any new and relevant circumstances that violate the provisions of this Section 12(2). The disclosures, as provided for in this Section, must meet the requirement as specified under the Sixth Schedule of the Act.

Challenges to an arbitrator’s appointment can only be made on the grounds of perceived bias in the form of lack of independence or impartiality, or non-compliance with agreed qualifications, and certain relationships, as detailed in the Seventh Schedule, which render individuals ineligible for appointment. However, parties can waive the disqualifications specified under the seventh schedule if they agree to do so in writing after disputes arise, as stated in the proviso to Section 12(5). Under Section 12(4), the parties can only raise a plea of disqualification if the discovery is after the appointment but not if the parties were aware of the disqualification at the time of appointment. This is traceable to the fundamental precepts of good faith and natural justice, i.e., parties cannot take advantage of their own wrongs or omissions or gain any tactical advantage which is prejudicial to the other party. The Amendment Act has been criticised on the ground that Section 12(4) and Section 12(5) seem to be in conflict with each other insofar as Section 12(5) does not mandate that the plea of ineligibility can only be raised during the proceedings if the objecting party was not aware of that ineligibility earlier, whereas Section 12(4) precisely does so. However, these two seemingly irreconcilable provisions may in fact be harmonized by presupposing Section 12(5) is to be read as being subject to Section 12(4). The Seventh Schedule prescribes nineteen instances when arbitrators can be disqualified. It builds upon the broad grounds specified under this Section to lay down specific instances warranting disqualification of an arbitrator. Additionally, since the terms “independent” and “impartial” are inherently vague, the Fifth Schedule serves as a comprehensive guide to determine whether a particular instance fulfils the requirements of independence and impartiality. The Sixth Schedule also provides the form in which such disclosure is required to be made.

History and Background of Section 12 

The Arbitration Act, 1940 did not contain any provision akin to Section 12 of the 1996 Act.2 Therefore, the 1996 Act modelled its scheme on the UNCITRAL Model Law3  and its corresponding rules, particularly in light of the fact that Article 12 of the Act corresponds to Article 12 of the Model Law dealing with the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. Moreover, the 2015 Amendment Act ushered in two major changes to Section 12 of the Act.4 These changes were mainly introduced pursuant to the recommendations made in the 246th Report of the Law Commission of India.5

Amendment to Section 12(1)

The Amendment substituted the previous version of Section 12(1) which stated, “When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality.” After this amendment, the sub-section reads, “When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any circumstances,— (a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or present relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subject- matter in dispute, whether financial, business, professional or other kind, which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and (b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to the arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire arbitration within a period of twelve months. Explanation 1 -The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator. Explanation 2 – The disclosure shall be made by such person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule.” 

Two significant changes were made through this amendment:

Firstly, the requirement of disclosure has been made more rigorous by inserting specific instances that necessitate such disclosure. Before such insertions, the phraseology of the Section was extremely subjective which led to several instances of the misuse. It relied primarily on the  discretion of the arbitrator to make disclosures. This created confusion as to the exact scope of the requirement of disclosures and thus gave the parties the opportunity to lodge frivolous challenges and encouraged incomplete disclosures by the arbitrators. Through the introduction of more specific and clear instances of disclosure, the problem now stands largely cured.

Secondly, a reference to the Fifth Schedule has been added. The Fifth Schedule was itself inserted through the 2015 amendment and lists out clear instances which constitute a violation of the principles of independence or impartiality of the arbitrator.

Therefore, the Fifth Schedule clarifies the scope of these two grounds which are inherently subjective words. In the absence of the Fifth Schedule, multiple interpretations could arise regarding what constitutes independence or impartiality which would lead to inconsistency and unjust outcomes. Thus, the amendment is much more elaborate and provides the required clarity to Section 12(1). The underlying purpose of this provision is to ensure neutrality and by virtue of this Amendment, the legislature has sought to achieve the same. Notably, the usage of the term “justifiable doubt” indicates that the test is not about actual bias with an onerous standard of proof but merely signals the existence of reasonable doubt as per the Dangers and Probability of Bias Test. This furthers the goal of the arbitrator being a completely neutral, impartial and independent entity, since even a sliver of a doubt as to his neutrality can endanger the sanctity of the arbitral proceeding. Imposing a strict standard of proof will unfairly advantage either party or the arbitrator, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case if the contesting party is unable to prove bias. Moreover, it is difficult to prove the absence of independence or impartiality since, most of the times, the arbitrator or the benefitting party enjoy a clandestine advantage. Therefore, most cases (C and E Limited v. Gopal Das Bagri for example) prefer the danger and probability of bias test, rather than the real danger of bias test.6 However, one caveat to this is that the test of likelihood of bias should not amount to “fanciful apprehension,” as held in the C and E Limited v. Gopal Das Bagri (2023) S.C.C. OnLine Cal 2166., in accordance with the principles of good faith and justice that does not allow wrongful advantage to be obtained. Therefore, this amendment constitutes a step in the right direction.

Insertion of Section 12(5)

The 2015 amendment also introduced sub-section 5, which clarifies that the appointment of an arbitrator can be challenged on any ground mentioned therein. The effect of this is to specify the exact grounds on which appointment can be challenged, which is advantageous because of the inherent ambiguity in the wording of Section 12 as analysed earlier. Notably, Section 12(5) must be read harmoniously with Section 12(3). The phrase “only if” in Section 12(3) indicates that Section 12(5) is a sub-set of Section 12(3) because it states specific grounds of disqualification that fall within the ambit of the main grounds enshrined under Section 12(3). Therefore, an inquiry Section 12(5) has to first be tested on the touchstone of Section 12(3). Like the Fifth Schedule, even the Seventh Schedule was added by virtue of the 2015 Amendment. Both these schedules were premised on the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration.7 In Kotak Mahindra Bank v. Narendra Kumar Prajapat, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 31488, the Delhi High Court observed that an ineligible arbitrator lacked the inherent jurisdiction to even render an arbitral award. The provision further stipulates that such disqualification can be waived through a mutual agreement between the parties. The requirement of an express waiver in writing has been emphasized in numerous judgements of the Delhi High Court, including in N.S. Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India.9 This waiver operates mainly in family disputes where a speedy resolution is of immense importance and in other cases where irrespective of doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator, both parties repose faith in the arbitrator’s capabilities and competence. Therefore, the 2015 amendment was a landmark amendment, especially with respect to the integral changes brought about to Section 12 of the Act. There have been no amendments to Section 12 and the Fifth and the Seventh schedules since then. Lastly, in Era International v. Aditya Birla Global Trading India Pvt. Ltd.10, the Bombay High Court clarified that Section 12(5) applies even to institutional arbitrations. Thus, even if the challenge to the mandate of the arbitrator is dismissed by applying the institutional rules, the jurisdiction of the court under Section 14 read with the Seventh Schedule of the Act is not ousted.

Judicial Evolution and Changes in the Interpretation of the Courts

There have been several precedents that have discussed the principles underlying Section 12 of the Act.

Section 12(5)

Section 12(5) references the Seventh Schedule and lists several conditions of ineligibility. Since it was added via the 2015 Amendment, the cases analysed in this sub-section are all after the 2015 Amendment.

1. Ability and Power of a Disqualified Arbitrator to Nominate Another Arbitrator

An important case that discussed this issue was TRF Limited v. Energo Engineering Projects Limited.11 The Court while discussing Section 12(5) held that if an arbitrator is disqualified under this section, they cannot nominate the mandate of another arbitrator. This was affirmed in  Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSSCC (India) Limited, which reaffirmed that any person having any interest in the arbitration cannot be appointed as an arbitrator and any such person disqualified is not eligible to nominate another person as the arbitrator.12 The decision in  Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Limited  affirmed the position as laid down in earlier pronouncements and reiterated that if the appointment of an arbitrator falls within the restrictions stipulated under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, they cannot continue as an arbitrator.13 In fact, the Delhi High Court, in Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. v. Shivaa Trading14, went on to observe that where the arbitrator is de jure ineligible to conduct proceedings, both the appointment of the arbitrator and the ensuing arbitral proceedings would be rendered void ab initio. This view was endorsed in Union of India v. M/s. M.V. Omni Projects (India) Ltd., O.M.P. (Comm.).15

A wealth of judicial opinion has also clarified that mere participation in arbitration proceedings would not constitute an ‘express waiver’ under Section 12(5). However, the Supreme Court, in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), adopted a different position by holding that even a general manager who was not eligible to be appointed as an arbitrator could nominate other arbitrators.16 This was a deviation from precedents like TRF Limited case and the Perkins Eastman Architects case. The initial position was restored in Union of India v. Tantia Constructions, where the Supreme Court explicitly held that the view taken in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra) was incorrect and referred the matter to a larger bench.17 The Supreme Court, in JSW Steel Limited v. South Western Railway and Another, also referred the matter to a larger bench.18 This position has been settled by a 5-judge bench decision which upheld the decisions in TRF and Perkins and held that a person disqualified to act as an arbitrator cannot nominate another arbitrator. Additionally, this judgment comprehensively discussed the tenets of Section 12, particularly the concept of bias and unequivocally held that unilateral appointments are invalid due to the corresponding violation of equality under Section 18 of the Act along with the inevitable presence of bias.19 The shifts in judicial interpretation reveal that Section 12(5) is a contested provision. However, it is largely accepted that a person disqualified to be an arbitrator cannot nominate another person as an arbitrator.

2. Other Observations with Respect to Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule 

In Voestalpine Schienen GmBH v. DMRC20 the Supreme Court held that the mere presence of retired employees on the arbitration panel could not justify the invocation of the Seventh Schedule. In fact, the Court urged and encouraged experts and retired judges to be on the panel. While examining the scope of the seventh schedule in HRD Corp v. GAIL  , the Court held that the grounds for disqualification laid down in the Seventh Schedule are merely illustrative and can be waived by entering into a specific agreement to that effect, provided specific conditions are fulfilled.21 The facts of this case revolved around tenders for the supply of wax, subsequently leading to the dispute pertaining to the wrongful withholding of wax supply by GAIL. The provision of waiver upheld by the Court is premised on the 246th Report of the Law Commission of India.22 Importantly, this judgment set out a broad test to determine the existence of “justifiable doubts” as to the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality. Accordingly, doubts “are only justifiable if a reasonable third person having knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances would reach the conclusion that there is a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case in reaching his or her decision. This test requires taking a broad common- sensical approach to the items stated in the Fifth and Seventh Schedules. This approach would, therefore, require a fair construction of the words used therein, neither tending to enlarge or restrict them unduly.”23 On the aspect of retrospective applicability of Section 12(5) of the Act, the Supreme Court, in Ellora Paper Mills Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh held that retrospective applicability was justified to preserve neutrality among arbitrators.24 Importantly, the Supreme Court observed that when the arbitration clause fell afoul of the amended Section 12(5) of the Act, the appointment of the arbitrator would be beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, thus empowering the Court to appoint the same.25 Reliance was placed on the decision in Jaipur Zila v. Ajay Sales and Suppliers, where a similar situation had come up for consideration.26 Referring to the decision in Bharat Broadband, it was observed that merely because a party had filed a Statement of Claim and participated in the arbitration proceedings did not mean that they had waived their right to challenge the mandate of the arbitrator. The requirement of a waiver had to be construed strictly and required an express agreement, as distinct from a “deemed waiver” which could be inferred from mere conduct.27 This was also reiterated in Prime Store28, which overruled the decision in Mcleod case.29 The Supreme Court has made it clear that to fulfil the requirements of a valid waiver, two prerequisites have to be met: the waiver can only be effected after the dispute has arisen, and the agreement has to be express. In doing so, it upheld the decision in Bharat Broadband Network.30 Lastly, in relation to the invalidity of  unilateral appointments, in the Mcleod case, the Court held that invalidity could only be based on the grounds in the Seventh Schedule.31 In the present case, although the appointment was made unilaterally, no assumption of bias on the part of the retired judge, was justifiable.32 Yet again, this position was overruled in Prime Store, which stated that unilateral appointments are invalid due to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of the arbitrator.33 This stands settled in the recent judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as discussed above.34

Other Sub-Sections

Since its introduction, there have been conflicting judgements on the interpretation of various sub-sections of Section 12. As mentioned previously, the unamended Section 12 was inherently ambiguous and was misused to a great extent.

1. Matters Governing In-House Arbitrators primarily in Cases Involving State Undertakings

Before the amendment, in arbitrations involving public sector  undertakings, the appointment of state personnel as arbitrators was considered valid, as seen in Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Raja Transport Limited.35 There were only two exceptions to this rule: First, when the arbitrator was directly involved with or in control of the subject-matter of the dispute (as seen in Denel Limited v. Ministry of Defence36) and second, in cases where the arbitrator was unequivocally impartial. However, this position considerably evolved with the introduction of the 2015 amendment, as observed in Assignia-VIL JV v. Rail Vikas Nigam Limited37 which placed reliance on Entry I of Schedule VII and held such appointments to be invalid.

2. Relationship between Arbitrators and Lawyers Appearing in the Arbitration Process

Before the 2015 Amendment, no presumption of bias existed merely because the appearing lawyers are members of the same chamber as the arbitrator. This was seen in Impex Corporation v. Elenjikal Aquamarine Exports Limited38, which relied on the decision in Laker Airways v. FLS Aerospace.39 However, after the amendment, the Fifth and Seventh Schedules clearly prohibit such appointments, thereby fundamentally altering the previous position and reconciling it with the overarching emphasis on neutrality.

3. Other Miscellaneous Matters Covered under Section 12

In a recent 2023 judgement (Chennai Metro Rail Limited v. Transtonnelstroy Afcons JV), it was held that a unilateral revision of the arbitrator fee did not render the arbitrator ineligible under Section 12 read with  Schedules Five and Seven of the Act.40 The decisions in Voestalpine and Perkins Eastman Architects, as discussed hereinabove, also explain the meaning of independence and impartiality as per Section 12(1)(a) and Section 12(3). While independence was seen as an objective concept to be ascertained at the beginning of the proceeding, impartiality was inherently subjective and could only be gauged once arbitration proceedings had commenced proceedings.41 The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam v. Space Tech Equipments42 read bias into the concepts of independence and impartiality and held that once bias is proven, the appointment of arbitrators was amenable to challenge under Section 14(3) read with the procedure for challenge under Section 13 of the Act. The term “bias” was explained in the Hasmukhlal H. Doshi v. M.L. Pendse, where it was held that “bias may be defined as a preconceived opinion or a predisposition or predetermination to decide a case or an issue in a particular manner, so much so that such predisposition does not leave the mind open to conviction.”43 Such bias was required to be disclosed under Section 12(2) of the Act. Additionally, the decision in Jay Bhagwati Construction Co. v. Haware Engineers and Builders Private Limited, reiterated the import of Section 12(1) and directed the arbitrator to file a disclosure as specified under the Sixth Schedule.44 In National Highways Authority of India v. GMR Pochanpalli Expressways Limited, the Court discussed the meaning and scope of Section 12(2).45 Similarly, the broad contours of Section 12(4) were explained in Chennai Metro Rail Limited v. Transtonnelstroy Afcons.46 The jurisprudence surrounding Section 12 has been fairly linear and consistent. Broadly, it stresses upon adherence with the principles of natural justice, including not having any personal interest or not being biased, which stand crystallised by way of a comprehensive statutory enactment.

Interplay with other Provisions

In conclusion, Sections 12, 13, Section 14 and the Fifth, Sixth and the Seventh schedule, acquire immense salience in applying the concepts of independence and impartiality in the framework of arbitration law. While Section 12 substantively lists out the conditions of ineligibility, Section 14 provides that if an arbitrator becomes de facto or de jure ineligible, their mandate shall stand terminated. Section 14(3) in fact refers to Section 12, showing their interlinkages and inter-dependence. Therefore, Section 14 contains the right to challenge the mandate of an arbitrator. Section 13, on the other hand, is procedural and describes the procedure to be followed in challenging the mandate of an arbitrator. Section 12 also must be read in conjunction with the Fifth schedule, which elaborates on the meaning of independence and impartiality by enlisting a few instances. Moreover, the Sixth Schedule provides for the form of disclosure, and the Seventh Schedule stipulates specific instances that can serve as guideposts while determining ineligibility under Section 12(5). Additionally, Section 12 also must be analysed in light of Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the Act, which stipulates that an arbitral award can be set aside if the composition of the tribunal is not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, if Section 12 is violated, the arbitral award can be set aside under Section 34 of the Act. Furthermore, such setting aside or a refusal to set aside can be challenged before the court by way of an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act.

  1. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 1996 (India).  ↩︎
  2. The Arbitration Act, 1940, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 1940 (India).  ↩︎
  3. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006). ↩︎
  4. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, No. 3 of 2016, Acts of Parliament, 2015 (India). ↩︎
  5. Law Commission of India, Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Report No. 246, 2014. ↩︎
  6. C and E Limited v. Gopal Das Bagri, 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2166. ↩︎
  7. International Bar Association (IBA) Council, IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration, 2014.             ↩︎
  8. Kotak Mahindra Bank v. Narendra Kumar Prajapat, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3148. ↩︎
  9. N.S. Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7686. ↩︎
  10. Era International v. Aditya Birla Global Trading India Pvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 835.  ↩︎
  11. TRF Limited v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377. ↩︎
  12. Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSSCC (India) Limited, AIR 2020 SC 59. ↩︎
  13. Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Limited, (2019) 5 SCC 755.  ↩︎
  14. Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. v. Shivaa Trading, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2937. ↩︎
  15. Union of India v. M/s MV Omni Projects (India) Ltd. OMP (Comm), 855/2023.  ↩︎
  16. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), 2019 SCC OnLine 1635, para. 37. ↩︎
  17. Union of India v. Tantia Constructions, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 271, paras. 1-2. ↩︎
  18. JSW Steel Limited v. South Western Railway and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1973, para. 7. ↩︎
  19. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), 2024 INSC 857, paras. 59- 137, 168-169. ↩︎
  20. Voestalpine Schienen GmBH v. DMRC, (2017) 4 SCC 665, paras. 25, 28. ↩︎
  21. HRD Corp v. GAIL, (2018) 12 SCC 471, paras. 12-15. ↩︎
  22. ibid, para. 15. ↩︎
  23. supra note 17, para. 20.  ↩︎
  24. Ellora Paper Mills Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 3 SCC 1, paras. 4, 12. ↩︎
  25. ibid, para. 7. ↩︎
  26. Jaipur Zila v. Ajay Sales and Suppliers, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 730, paras. 8-11. ↩︎
  27. supra note 20, para. 8. ↩︎
  28. M/S Prime Store v. Sugam Vanjiya Holdings, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 2898, paras. 36, 54. ↩︎
  29. Mcleod Russel India Limited and Anr v. Aditya Birla Finance Limited and Ors, 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 330, para. 50. ↩︎
  30. supra note 15, paras. 121, 123. ↩︎
  31. supra note 25, para. 18, 19. ↩︎
  32. supra note 25, paras. 38, 44. ↩︎
  33. supra note 24, paras. 27-66. ↩︎
  34. supra note 15. ↩︎
  35. Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Raja Transport Limited, (2009) SCC 8 520, para. 16. ↩︎
  36. Denel Limited v. Ministry of Defence, AIR 2012 SC 817, paras. 17-20. ↩︎
  37. Assignia-VIL JV v. Rail Vikas Nigam Limited, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2567, paras. 42-44. ↩︎
  38. Impex Corporation v. Elenjikal Aquamarine Exports Limited, AIR 2008 Ker 119, para. 3. ↩︎
  39. Laker Airways v. FLS Aerospace, (2000) 1 WLR 113. ↩︎
  40. Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. v. Transtonnelstroy Afcons JV, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1370, paras. 33-34. ↩︎
  41. supra note 16, para. 21; supra note 10, para. 19. ↩︎
  42. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam v. Space Tech Equipments, 2020 SCC OnLine AP 147. ↩︎
  43. Hasmukhlal H. Doshi v. M.L. Pendse, 2000(3) BOMCR 672, para. 5. ↩︎
  44. Jay Bhagwati Construction Co. v. Haware Engineers and Builders Private Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3873. ↩︎
  45. National Highways Authority of India v. GMR Pochanpalli Expressways Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 980.  ↩︎
  46. Chennai Metro Rail Limited v. Transtonnelstroy Afcons JV, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1370. ↩︎